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Abstract
When governments care about tax revenues, the taxability of diﬀerent forms of
economic activity will influence the decisions of governments about what activity to
support. If factors of production are mobile across sectors which diﬀer in their taxa-
bility, political economies will organize themselves into equilibria where governments
support activity because resources are allocated to it, which in turn encourages that
resource allocation.
When resources and government support are organized in support of an “old” equi-
librium, and the possibility of a “new,” possibly more eﬃcient equilibrium beckons,
the relative taxability of the old and new sectors will determine the likelihood of such
a shift. In postcommunist Europe, such factors were influential in the creation of
two general political-economic configurations: one where new economic activity is sup-
ported by the government and is common, and one where such support is lacking and
new businesses are rare. Diﬀerences in relative taxability of new and old economic
activity contribute to the prevalence of the first configuration in Eastern Europe, and
the second in the former Soviet Union.
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1. Introduction
An enduring puzzle of political economy is why economies persist in ineﬃcient form when
the possibility of evolution exists. Examples abound: Ten years into the postcommunist
transition, most individuals in the former Soviet Union remain employed by minimally prof-
itable former state enterprises, while corruption and overregulation prevent new firms from
taking root. Workers and politicians maintain their support for aging factories in monoin-
dustrial towns, despite more profitable opportunities that only need a helping hand from
the government to get oﬀ the ground. Governments in countries rich in natural resources
preserve their symbiotic relationships with large extraction industries, despite clear evidence
of the benefits of economic diversification.
As these examples suggest, what often needs explaining is the failure of the government
to provide the necessary support for new economic activity, rather than the failure of the
economy to provide the necessary preconditions. Of course, what constitutes “support” will
vary according to the political-economic context. In some cases, explicit state intervention
may be necessary to break out of a low-productivity trap, perhaps by providing public goods
necessary for economic development (including the necessary regulatory infrastructure, as
stressed by Vogel 1996) or by solving the coordination problems of individual economic actors
(as in the “big push” literature in development economics — see Rosenstein-Rodan 1943 and
Murphy et al 1989). In others, what is needed is less of traditional state behavior: less
corruption, less overregulation, etc. Paradoxically, this hands-oﬀ approach may require the
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active (and costly) involvement of senior government oﬃcials if it is subordinate parts of the
state that are doing the rent seeking. Alternatively, “support” may merely be restraint on
the part of senior politicians, where the costliness of that support is the opportunity cost of
rents foregone.
Whatever the nature of support, it is often underprovided by governments, meaning that
governments do not equate the marginal social benefit of support with the marginal cost of
providing it. Why that should be the case is the partial focus of a vast literature in political
science and economics on (“bad”) policy choice. Robinson (1998) surveys this literature,
distinguishing between theories in which governments are interested in maximizing social
welfare but have incorrect beliefs about how to do so, and theories in which political actors
choose ineﬃcient policies because they have interests other than welfare maximization in
mind (see also Acemoglu 2002).
This paper falls into the latter category, assuming as in much of the political-economy
literature that the state is interested in tax revenues rather than social welfare (e.g., North
1981, Levi 1988, Brennan and Buchanan 1980), and that it thus allocates support across sec-
tors based on the exogenous taxability of economic activity, i.e. the ease with which the state
can extract revenues from economic actors.1 Building upon this basic argument — for which
Gehlbach (2003a) provides empirical support from a survey of firms in 23 postcommunist
1Gehlbach (2003b) relaxes the crude assumption of revenue maximization by considering the allocation
of government support across sectors when elected politicians value tax revenues not for their own sake, but
as a means of providing goods desired by voters.
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countries — the simple model presented in Section 2 below shows that factor mobility can
exaggerate the impact of diﬀerences in taxability across sectors, so that even small diﬀer-
ences in relative taxability can translate into large diﬀerences in support. States, interested
in tax revenues, choose whether or not to support an economic sector based on its revenue
potential, which is determined both by the size of sector and its taxability. But factors
of production, if mobile, in turn choose whether or not to locate in a sector based in part
on the degree of government support provided. Thus, the model suggests that government
support and factors of production will pool together in one sector or the other, but not both
simultaneously.
Two empirical predictions follow: First, one should see countries sorting themselves into
two groups: one where government support and factors of production are concentrated in
old, less productive economic activity, and one where they are concentrated in new, more
productive economic activity. Second, movement from the “old equilibrium” to the “new
equilibrium” — perhaps in response to an exogenous shock to resource allocation — will be less
likely if the old sector is relatively more taxable and if government support (however defined)
is essential for economic output. Thus, countries can become stuck in low-productivity traps
due to the relatively low taxability of alternative economic activity.
Section 3 uses the model to explain the “great divide” in postcommunist countries, where
government support and resource allocation are concentrated in new businesses in Eastern
Europe, but in the old (formerly or still) state-owned sector in the former Soviet Union.
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Consistent with the argument in this paper, it is indeed the case that there are small diﬀer-
ences in taxability across firm types in Eastern Europe, but large diﬀerences in the former
Soviet Union.
In exploring the impact of taxability of economic activity on government support for
business, this paper touches on many of the themes of the literature on fiscal incentives
of politicians (see, e.g., Gordon and Li 1997), including work emphasizing the influence of
fiscal federalist systems in creating positive (as in China) or negative (as in Russia) incen-
tives for local politicians to support growth, as well as that relating diﬀerences in taxability
across sectors and countries to empirical variation in government support of business activ-
ity.2 However, most of this literature only considers the impact of government behavior on
economic performance, and not the feedback from the latter to the former; as such, it does
not explain the multiple equilibria predicted by this model and observed in reality. One
exception is Berkowitz and Li (2000), but in their model the sector that is harder to tax (the
unoﬃcial sector) is less productive than the sector easier to tax. As will be argued below,
quite often the opposite is true.
Models in which resource allocation to a particular sector in turn encourages more allo-
cation to that sector include the formalization of the “big push” argument cited above, as
well as models of the unoﬃcial economy in transition countries (Johnson et al 1997, Roland
2On fiscal federalism, see, e.g., Oi (1992) and Qian andWeingast (1996) on China, and Zhuravskaya (2000)
on Russia. Gehlbach surveys the literature on taxability and government support of business activity and
provides an organizing theoretical framework.
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and Verdier 1999). As in the unoﬃcial-economy models, government support in the model
in this paper flows into a particular sector only if resources are concentrated in that sector,
where resource concentration is in turn determined by government support. Unlike in the
unoﬃcial-economy models, the state is a monopoly provider of public goods (support) in this
paper, and the government is a strategic actor. The distinctions are important: when the
state has a monopoly over public goods provision, higher taxability unambiguously discour-
ages resource allocation to a sector unless politicians are strategically motivated to provide
support in part based on a sector’s size. When they are so motivated, the additional sup-
port engendered by higher taxability can encourage factors to locate in a sector, perhaps in
disproportionate measure to diﬀerences in taxability across sectors.
While useful, the simple model presented in Section 2 abstracts from reality in various
ways. Through a series of extensions to the basic model, Section 4 examines the robustness
of the argument, considering the provision of public goods financed by tax revenues, the
necessity of government support for economic activity, and economies of scale in the provision
of that support. Discussion of welfare considerations concludes this section and the paper.
2. A Simple Model
Consider an economy in which there are two economic sectors, indexed by S ∈ {O,N},
where O represents an old sector and N a new sector. For simplicity, assume labor to
be the sole input into production, with total labor supply inelastic and normalized to one,
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and the proportion of labor in sector i equal to Li.3 (In what follows, we will often refer
to “resources” rather than labor.) Labor is homogenous, and production from labor is
augmented by a sector-specific productivity parameter αS and sector-specific government
support eS, so that total output in sector S is YS = αSLSeS. For a given level of government
support, productivity in the new sector will typically be higher, so that αN > αO. Thus,
in contrast to the old sector, the new sector might be unburdened by an obsolete capital
stock or a diﬃcult-to-replace workforce, or might benefit from a diﬀerent ownership form.
Nonetheless, overall productivity might be lower in the new sector if government support is
insuﬃcient.
In this section we assume that government support is necessary for production to take
place, and that this support is sector-specific. We relax the assumption of necessity in
Section 4.2. Let eN and eO be the level of support of the new and old sector, respectively.
This assistance might take two forms. First, the government may have a role to play in
facilitating economic activity by providing the necessary legal framework for markets to exist
and by solving certain coordination problems. In the U.S., for example, internet commerce
has been encouraged by legislation recognizing electronic signatures as legally binding, while
in postcommunist Europe legislation and decrees legalizing markets were necessary before
3Elasticity of total labor supply can be easily incorporated into the model by assuming that there is an
alternative sector R which is nonproductive (or at least nontaxable) and which provides utility to labor of
u(LR), with u concave and certain limit conditions assumed. Of the major results in this section, multiple
equilibria will hold (with the same indiﬀerence conditions defining the intermediate equilibrium) regardless
of the elasticity of total labor supply, while Corollary 1 will hold if total labor supply is not too elastic, i.e.
if marginal returns to labor in sector R diminish quickly enough.
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private economic activity could operate on any substantial scale. Second, in many political-
economic environments, corruption, overregulation, and other “government failures” are the
norm, with relief possible only through the active intervention of senior government oﬃcials.
Regardless of whether the state oﬀers a “helping hand” or restrains its “grabbing hand”
(Shleifer and Vishny (1998)), providing support is costly: promoting one package of laws
means that other bills are pushed oﬀ the legislative calendar or political capital is expended,
giving up a share of bribes collected by lower-level bureaucrats implies an opportunity cost,
preventing maladministration by lower-level government employees requires time and energy,
etc. For simplicity, in this section we assume that this cost is not borne by the treasury,
but rather is a personal cost c(eO+eN) of the senior government oﬃcials which make up the
state, with c(.) strictly increasing and convex, c(0) = 0, and limx→0 c0(x) = 0.4 In Section
4.1 we show that qualitatively similar results obtain if we instead assume that public goods
are financed out of tax revenues.
Since supporting economic activity is costly, the government will weigh the cost of support
against the benefits. In this model, we assume that the benefits come in the form of increased
tax revenues. That governments are interested in at least some tax revenue should be
uncontroversial: even proponents of the most limited state need tax revenues to pay the
night watchman. Nonetheless, this assumption may be less reflective of reality the better are
states at collecting taxes. Thus, this is a model of a political economy in which tax revenue
4This functional form is chosen for simplicity. We could instead assume cost c(eO, eN ), with cS , cSS > 0,
cOOcNN > (cOcN )
2, c(0, 0) = 0, and limeS→0 cS(eO, eN ) = 0, with analogous results.
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is relatively scarce, where the desire for tax revenue dominates considerations other than
the cost of supporting economic activity. In Section 3, we use the model to interpret the
experience of postcommunist countries, many of which have faced particularly acute fiscal
crises following the collapse of communism.
We assume that the proportion of revenues that can be extracted from a particular
sector is exogenous, with TS being the level of taxability of sector S. There are two possible
interpretations of this assumption. First, the government can be viewed as setting tax rates
optimally, given the opportunities for tax evasion in a particular sector. Thus, the level of
taxability of a given sector represents the tax rate associated with the peak of the Laﬀer curve
for that sector.5 Second, the state in this model can be viewed as a lower-level (regional, local)
authority whose taxing power is set by a higher-level government, as in a fiscal federalist
arrangement. Of course, the central government may also take the relative taxability of
diﬀerent sectors into account when setting tax rates. In either case, TN will often be less
than TO. For example, as will be discussed in Section 3 below, governments in the former
Soviet Union have found it especially diﬃcult to extract tax revenues from new, small firms
relative to old, large enterprises. Similarly, governments in resource-rich countries often find
it substantially easier to tax the resource-extraction sector than manufacturing or service
activity.
5Crudely, consider a generalized version of this model in which the state sets tax rates tO and tN , with
the cost of collecting taxes from a sector equal to zero for ts ≤ Ts, and infinitely (or suﬃciently) high for
ts > Ts. Taking labor allocation as given, the politician will then set tax rates equal to TO and TN .
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Thus, the government solves the following problem:
max
eO,eN
TOαOLOeO + TNαNLNeN − c(eO + eN) (2.1)
As marginal returns to government eﬀort are constant in each sector, the government will
allocate all of its eﬀort to the sector oﬀering the highest return, so that:
qO = f(TOαOLO), qN = 0 if TOαOLO > TNαNLN (2.2)
qO = 0, qN = f(TNαNLN) if TOαOLO < TNαNLN
qO + qN = f(TOαOLO) = f(TNαNLN) if TOαOLO = TNαNLN
where we define f(x) such that if c0(y) = x, y = f(x). Obviously, given that c(.) is a convex
function, f 0(.) > 0, while f(0) = 0 follows from the limit condition on c0(.). Critically for
the discussion that follows in Section 3, note that if TN/TO is low enough, the government
will not support the new sector unless the bulk of labor is in that sector or the inherent
productivity advantage of the new sector is overwhelming.
Simultaneously with the government decision, individuals decide how to allocate their
labor between the new and old sector. Since labor is the only input into production, all
post-tax profits accrue to the workers in that sector. Since agents are homogeneous, labor
11
flows entirely to the sector oﬀering the highest post-tax return. Thus,
LO = 1 (LN = 0) if (1− TO)αOeO > (1− TN)αNeN (2.3)
LO = 0 (LN = 1) if (1− TO)αOeO < (1− TN)αNeN
LO ∈ [0, 1] (LN = 1− LO) if (1− TO)αOeO = (1− TN)αNeN
Comparing (2.2) to (2.3) shows the nature of equilibrium in this model: Government support
of an economic sector causes resources (here, labor) to be allocated to that sector, which in
turn encourages the government to support the sector. Thus, there are multiple equilibria,
as summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. When the government can provide support on a sector-specific basis, there
are three equilibria:
1) Old equilibrium: L∗O = 1, L
∗
N = 0, e
∗
O = f(TOLO), e
∗
N = 0.
2) New equilibrium: L∗O = 0, L
∗
N = 1, e
∗
O = 0, e
∗
N = f(TNLN).
3) Intermediate equilibrium: L
∗
N
L∗O
= TOαO
TNαN
, e
∗
N
e∗O
= (1−TO)αO
(1−TN )αN , e
∗
O + e
∗
N = f(TOαOL
∗
O) =
f(TNαNL∗N), and L
∗
O + L
∗
N = 1.
Proof. That (1) and (2) are equilibria is immediately apparent. The nature of the
intermediate equilibrium follows from the condition for the government to be indiﬀerent
between providing support to the old sector and to the new (TOαOLO = TNαNLN) and
the condition for labor to be indiﬀerent between locating in the old sector and the new
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((1− TO)αOeO = (1− TN)αNeN). That no other equilibria are possible is discussed below.
In one extreme equilibrium, the government supports the old sector but not the new,
thus encouraging labor to locate in the old sector, which in turn reinforces the government
decision to support that sector. A similar equilibrium exists where both government eﬀort
and labor are concentrated in the new sector.
In each of the extreme equilibria, government eﬀort is e∗S = f(TSαS), e
∗
−S = 0, where
S is the sector supported. Thus, government eﬀort in equilibrium is increasing in both the
productivity of the supported sector and its taxability. From labor’s point of view, then, an
increase in taxability is not unambiguously bad, but must be weighed against the improved
incentives it provides to the government. Indeed, as the following corollary indicates, labor
utility will be increasing in taxability for suﬃciently low TS:
Corollary 1. Labor utility in either of the extreme equilibria will be increasing in TS for
TS suﬃciently low, where S is the sector supported.
Proof. Labor utility ULS = (1 − TS)αSf(αSTS) in the extreme equilibrium in support
of sector S. Since f 00 < 0, which follows from the shape of the cost function c(.), ULS is
concave in TS on TS ∈ (0, 1), with limTS→0 ∂ULS∂TS > 0, and limTS→1
∂ULS
∂TS
< 0. Thus, ∂ULS∂TS > 0
over some interval TS ∈ (0, T¯S).
Corollary 1 does not say that economic actors will not find it optimal to avoid paying
taxes. For example, avoiding taxes is a dominant strategy, given that the government
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observes the tax behavior only of sectors and not of any individual taxpayer. However,
Corollary 1 suggests that if tax evasion is easy, and government support of business activity
depends on the taxability of that activity, then eﬀorts to improve revenue collection (by a
central government interested in the impact of tax incentives at the local level, by taxpayers
acting collectively) may not be unambiguously negative from the point of view of taxpayers,
even discounting the use of government revenues to pay for tax-financed public goods enjoyed
by both sectors. Indeed, Gehlbach (2003a) demonstrates empirically that the more that
firms in postcommunist Europe underreport revenues to tax authorities, the more likely those
firms are to say that they would be willing to pay more in taxes to eliminate corruption and
overregulation.
There is also an intermediate equilibrium where the old and new sectors coexist, defined
as in Proposition 1. In contrast to the extreme equilibria, this equilibrium is unstable. For
example, if LO = αNTNαOTO+αNTN + ², then the government will find it optimal to support the old
sector only, which in turn will encourage that portion of the labor force still in the new sector
to abandon it. Thus, the model predicts that one should observe political economies sorting
themselves into two groups: one where political institutions support a new economic sector,
which is where resources tend to be concentrated, and one where resources and government
support remain concentrated in an old sector. Indeed, many observers have seen precisely
this pattern develop in postcommunist Europe, as by the late 1990s the countries of east-
central Europe and the Baltics were more “new” in political-economic configuration, while
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the non-Baltic post-Soviet republics looked more “old.” The following section discusses this
development in terms of the basic model.
3. The “Great Divide” in Postcommunist Europe
In the early 1990s in postcommunist Europe, the key question for many policy makers,
advisors, and scholars was how to eﬀect a shift from an old equilibrium in which the state
was heavily involved in the economy and most individuals and capital were employed in
state-owned enterprises, to a new equilibrium with state support for an economy in which
private enterprise would be predominant. Privatization was seen as the central element
of a strategy to eﬀect this shift. What was necessary was to create a “private property
regime” — a “social and economic order defining a new set of expectations that individuals
may have with respect to their ability to dispose of the assets recognized as ‘theirs’ by the
legal system” (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994, p. 169) — as well as to provide the necessary
conditions for private property to be profitably employed. But, paradoxically, such an
environment could not be created in the absence of private property, as the state would
have no interest in providing the necessary institutions. Privatization, enacted during the
“window of opportunity” (Balcerowicz 1994) opened briefly by the collapse of the ancien
regime, would create the constituency necessary for these institutions to develop, providing
political pressure on the state long after the enactors of privatization had disappeared from
the political scene (see especially Boycko et al, 1995; also Schmidt 2000, Roland and Verdier
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1994).
In essence, what many oﬃcials and analysts seemed to have in mind was a variant of
the model presented in Section 2, where the future state would respond to political pressure
from the owners of capital and their employees:
max
eO,eN
LOeO + LNeN − c(eO + eN) (3.1)
In this formulation, it is the size of the sector, in the sense of allocation of resources, that is
the first-order concern. The more resources allocated to a sector, the larger the incentive of
the government to support it. As in the model in the previous section, when the government
has such an objective function there is both an “old equilibrium” and a “new equilibrium.”
The hope was that privatization, carried out by political actors with objectives diﬀerent from
those defined in (3.1), would force the hand of future generations of policy makers. With
capital and (especially) labor relatively immobile in the short run, government behavior
would shift towards support of new, private economic activity if mass privatization pushed
LN
LO
high enough, eﬀecting a move towards a new equilibrium..
How successful were the architects of privatization in achieving this goal? To answer
this question, we must be more precise about what “new” is. If one takes “new” to be
private as opposed to state-owned economic activity, then privatization must be judged a
success. Across the postcommunist world, property which has been privatized has largely
stayed in private hands. While a societal consensus has not formed everywhere in support of
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private property, there has been no major attempt to political elites to renationalize formerly
state-owned property, and no major reallocation of resources out of the private sector back
into that portion of the state sector which remains.6 The “mass” nature of privatization in
most postcommunist countries, in which LN
LO
reached very high levels, likely has much to do
with the unwillingness of postcommunist politicians to seriously attempt renationalization.
However, with the benefit of hindsight, it now seems clear that the better definition of
“new” is truly new economic activity. Across the postcommunist world, the performance
of de novo enterprises has clearly outstripped that of privatized enterprises, even where
privatization has had a beneficial economic impact (see, e.g., World Bank 2002, ch. 4,
and the review in Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 2000). Despite the seeming eﬃciency
benefits of promoting such economic activity, however, not all governments have shown
the same interest in providing an environment in which new firms can flourish, one where
corruption and overregulation are kept to a minimum and contracts and property rights are
enforced. In particular, a “great divide” (Berglof and Bolton 2002) has opened between
Eastern Europe and the Baltics on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union less the
Baltics on the other. In the former, governments are generally supportive of new business
activity, with a corresponding flow of labor and capital into de novo enterprises. In the
latter, both state support and factors of production have largely remained in the old (state
6There are exceptions. In Russia, for example, there has been some attempt by governors to acquire
ownership of enterprises which have accumulated large debts to regional governments. See, e.g., Barnes
(2002) or EWI Russian Regional Report, Nov. 14, 2001, “New Ulyanovsk Governor Plans to Maintain
Control Over Privatized Enterprises.” Nonetheless, for the moment these appear to be the exceptions which
prove the rule. On changes in attitudes as a result of privatization, see Earle and Gehlbach (2003).
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and privatized) sector.7 Figure 1 illustrates the divide: by the late 1990s, the share of
employment in small enterprises (a term largely synonymous with “new enterprises” in the
postcommunist world) was around 50 percent in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, while in the
former Soviet Union less the Baltics small firms made up only one fifth of total employment.8
FIGURE 1
What accounts for this sharp divide? The model presented in Section 2 suggests that
governments will provide support to new firms, which in the present context amounts to
providing a bureaucratic environment which does not stifle new business activity, only if the
benefit in the form of tax revenues is suﬃcient. As before, privatization might in principle
have provided the exogenous shock to labor allocation necessary for the political economy to
settle into the new equilibrium. After all, it was not only large manufacturing enterprises
which were privatized, but also real estate, shops, and other assets which could be used
to start new firms.9 Nonetheless, this was clearly a smaller proportion of total assets in
the economy than the share of private property overall post-privatization, so LN
LO
was not
overwhelming. Given that, the question of whether the economy would tip into the new
equilibrium or not depended more critically on the incentives facing governments in the
7Various studies have explored government-business relations in transition countries using data from
surveys of firms. See, e.g., Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann (2000) for survey evidence from 22 postcommunist
countries, Johnson et al (2000) for results from five East European and former Soviet states, Frye and Shleifer
(1997) for a comparative analysis of Russia and Poland, Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000) and CEFIR and World
Bank (2002) for Russia, and Pop-Eleches (1998) for Romania. The first three works all document the greater
burden imposed on small businesses in the former Soviet Union.
8See also Boeri and Terrell (2002) on labor reallocation. World Bank (2002) discusses the equivalence of
“small” and “new” in the postcommunist world.
9On “small privatization” in postcommunist countries, see, e.g., Earle et al (1994).
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region.10
Those incentives were intimately related to the fiscal crisis that engulfed much of the
postcommunist world following the collapse of communism (see, e.g., IMF 1998). The
nature of the crisis was twofold: on the one hand, postcommunist politicians inherited
levels of expenditure that could be reduced only at significant political cost; on the other,
the tax revenues necessary to meet those obligations declined dramatically as a result of both
the general output collapse and a decrease in the ability of the state to extract revenues from
the economy. Faced with crumbling infrastructure, wage arrears, and demands from various
interest groups for subsidies and transfers, the desire to increase tax revenues has been
a first-order concern for most postcommunist politicians.11 In such an environment, the
government objective function (2.1) in Section 2 is likely a better approximation of reality
than (3.1).
The best-reply correspondence (2.2) shows that the government will find it optimal to
support new firms only if LN
LO
≥ TOαO
TNαN
. Thus, in looking to explain the divergent performance
of the two halves of the postcommunist world, we should look for evidence that LN
LO
, TO
TN
, or
αO
αN
are markedly diﬀerent in the former Soviet Union than in Eastern Europe. Substantial
10In emphasizing the perspective provided by the model in Section 2, this paper does not discount the
importance of complementary explanations for divergent outcomes, including the nature of political institu-
tions (Hellman 1998), speed of reform (Aslund, Boone, and Johnson 1996), culture and historical experience
(McDaniel 1996), the results of early elections (Fish 1998), and the incentives provided by the possibility
of EU accession (Janos 2002). That said, some of these explanations are more consistent with a smooth
gradient of political and economic development across the postcommunist world, rather than the sharp divide
observed in practice.
11Akhmedov et al (2002) discusses the importance of public expenditures in determining regional electoral
outcomes in Russia.
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diﬀerences in αOαN can be dismissed on theoretical grounds: given the massive misallocation
of resources in communist economies, the inherent productivity of any new enterprise was
likely quite large relative to that of most of the old state sector across the postcommunist
world. Table 1 suggests that diﬀerences in LN
LO
were also small. There is little variation
across postcommunist countries in the scale of small-scale privatization, which formed the
foundation for development of the new, small-business sector. With the exception of Belarus,
all countries represented in Table 1 had implemented a “nearly comprehensive program” of
small-scale privatization (a score of 3 on the EBRD Index of Small-Scale Privatization) by
1999. Indeed, on average, progress in small-scale privatization was larger in the former
Soviet Union than was progress with large-scale privatization in Eastern Europe.
TABLE 1
In contrast, the aggregate revenue figures reported in Table 1 suggest the possibility that
TO
TN
was substantially higher in the eastern half of the postcommunist world. Collecting taxes
has been a particular problem in the former Soviet Union, with tax collection averaging 27
percent of GDP among CIS members in 1999, whereas by and large the countries of Eastern
Europe and the Baltics have had fewer diﬃculties meeting their revenue needs, extracting
37 percent of GDP on average as taxes.12 Again, Belarus is the exception to the rule, as the
virtual absence of large-scale privatization in that country, together with the maintenance
12The literature is unanimous in its view that the lower revenue figures in the former Soviet Union are due
to the state’s inability to collect taxes, and not to any greater desire on the part of the general population to
limit government expenditures. See, e.g., Hemming et al (1995), Ebrill and Havrylyshyn (1999), or Schaﬀer
and Turley (2000).
20
of various institutions of state power, has allowed the state to continue to collect taxes at
Soviet-era levels. Lower tax collection overall, if aﬀecting all sectors equally, will result in a
higher TO
TN
if TO > TN : defining TO = T + t and TN = T , a decline in T increases TOTN .
To more carefully test the proposition that new firms are especially hard to tax in the
former Soviet Union, we use firm-level data from a survey of enterprises carried out in
1999 by the World Bank and EBRD in the 23 postcommunist countries listed in Table 1.13
Firms in the survey, of which slightly more than half are de novo enterprises, were asked,
“What percentage of sales of a typical firm in your area of activity would you estimate is
reported to the tax authorities, bearing in mind diﬃculties in complying with taxes and other
regulations?” If one accepts that respondents answer based on their personal experience,
as is typically assumed when sensitive questions are posed in this way, then this is a rough
measure of the degree to which firms are taxable: firms which find it easier to hide revenues,
perhaps because they are more likely to deal in cash or because government oﬃcials are less
familiar with their operations, will report less of their revenues to tax authorities. Gehlbach
(2003a) justifies this assumption by demonstrating that the covariance of this variable with
sector and country of residence corresponds with publicly available data on tax compliance
by sector and country.
13In fact, there are 26 countries represented in the data set, but firms in Bosnia and the Serb Republic
in Bosnia were dropped due to the long war in those entities, while firms in Turkey were not included in
the analysis since Turkey is not a postcommunist country. Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman
(2000) presents an overview of the BEEPS project and details on the survey instrument. Gehlbach (2003a)
provides more information on the variables used in the analysis here, with the exception of the de novo
variable, which is not used in the analysis in that paper.
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Table 2 presents results of three regressions of this measure of taxability on various firm
characteristics, including dummies for de novo status and location in the former Soviet Union
(less the Baltics).14 While there is a great deal of noise in the data, the impact of de novo
status is quite precisely estimated, as can be seen from the results of the first model. New
firms in Eastern Europe and the Baltics report three percentage points more of their revenues
to tax authorities than do old firms, while the reverse is the case in the former Soviet Union.
(The linear combination of the de novo dummy and its interaction with the dummy for
presence in the former Soviet Union is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.)
TABLE 2
Why might new firms be especially diﬃcult to tax in the former Soviet Union? Generally
speaking, there are two possibilities: states may find it diﬃcult to tax such firms because of
their novelty per se, or because of some characteristic which these firms share. As mentioned
above, the one characteristic common to almost all new enterprises in the postcommunist
world is small size. Of the de novo firms in the sample, fully 85 percent have fewer than 100
employees (vs. 32 percent of old firms). The second model presented in Table 2 regresses
revenue reporting on the log of employment and its interaction with presence in the former
Soviet Union. Across the postcommunist world, small firms report less of their revenues to
tax authorities, presumably because their size makes it easier for them to deal in cash, or
14In all regressions, enterprises which are joint ventures between domestic and foreign firms are dropped
from the sample: while generally “new” in postcommunist countries, joint ventures are fundamentally
diﬀerent from the de novo domestic firms which are the focus here. There is no substantial diﬀerence in
results if instead joint ventures are included and classified as new.
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because it is easier to remain below the radar screen of tax authorities when a firm is small.
However, this eﬀect is especially pronounced in the former Soviet Union, where the eﬀect of
size is twice as large as that in Eastern Europe. As in the first model, marginal eﬀects are
quite large.
The third model jointly tests the impact of novelty and size, including the de novo
dummy and log of employment, and the interaction of both with the location dummy. Both
interaction terms are statistically significant, and both sizeable. Thus, governments in the
former Soviet Union seem to find it harder to tax de novo firms both because they are small
and because they are new.
As to why novelty and size might be particular problems for tax collection in the former
Soviet Union, at least three possibilities present themselves:
• One-company towns: Relative to Eastern Europe, the economic landscape of the Soviet
Union seems to have been disproportionately populated by cities with a single or a few
large enterprises, many located far from any other population center.15 In such an
environment, given a fixed cost of collecting taxes from any given enterprise, the relative
cost of collecting taxes from old enterprises is particularly low.16 In contrast, the more
diverse economic geography of Eastern Europe reduced the incentive to concentrate on
15This is certainly the conventional view, though little cross-national work has been done. On Russia, see
Brown et al (1994), Expert Institute (2000), and Andrienko and Guriev (2002).
16This eﬀect may be exaggerated if local politicians are largely responsible for the local business environ-
ment, and if such politicians cut deals with large local firms to protect them from federal taxes in return for
larger payments — perhaps in kind — to the regional budget (Treisman 1999, Sonin 2003).
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a few old enterprises.
• Banks: While doing business in cash helps a firm to avoid tax obligations, holding
cash is costly. The opportunity cost of holding cash depends on the benefits of instead
maintaining bank deposits, which will be greater where financial markets are well
developed, as well as on firm-specific characteristics, such as size and industrial sector.
Across the region, large firms find it impossible to avoid the banking sector. However,
given the better development of financial markets in Eastern Europe (Berglof and
Bolton 2002), small firms in those countries are less likely to deal in cash, and thus
more likely to pay their taxes.
• Low-hanging fruit and short fruit pickers: Limited administrative capacity and the
scale of state collapse in general has led tax oﬃcials in the former Soviet Union to
concentrate their resources on entities which they know how to and can tax. Thus,
recent entrants — never having been part of the state planning apparatus, and engaged
in relatively novel business activity — are more likely to be neglected.
In all likelihood, some combination of these and other factors is behind the quite diﬀerent
relative taxability of new and old firms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Whatever the reasons, the fact that TO
TN
was considerably higher in the latter may have
encouraged diﬀerent patterns of support for new and old businesses across the region, which
together with factor mobility, led to the great divide in government performance and factor
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allocation that had developed by the late 1990s.
4. Discussion and Extensions
A number of simplifying assumptions were made in developing the model presented in Section
2. This section considers the impact of relaxing those assumptions, and examines the welfare
implications of the model. As will be seen, the assumption that government support is not
financed from public funds is unimportant, while the assumptions that production may not
take place without government support and that there are perfect economies of scale in
the provision of that support may be partially relaxed without any qualitative change in
results. Further, the old equilibrium — while possibly ineﬃcient — may be second-best if the
government would provide little support in the new equilibrium.
4.1. Tax-Financed Public Goods
In Section 2, we assumed that government support is provided at no cost to the public trea-
sury, but is costly to the government for other reasons. This is plausible if one assumes
that government support entails the expenditure of time or energy monitoring lower-level
bureaucrats, or involves an opportunity cost in terms of rents foregone or other political
priorities not pursued. However, other forms of support might require the expenditure of
public funds, as when encouraging bureaucratic compliance necessitates increasing govern-
ment wages. Thus, a natural question is whether the results in Section 2 depend on the
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assumption that support is provided by the state at no cost to the public treasury. The
answer is no.
Consider the following alternative model. Rather than providing support eO and eN
at cost c(eO + eN), the state uses tax revenues to produce public goods which improve the
productivity of labor. Some proportion λO of total public-goods production q will be useful
to the old sector alone, while the remaining proportion λN = 1 − λO will benefit the new
sector only.17 Thus, production in sector S is YS = αSLSλSq.
Obviously, if the state is motivated by the desire to produce tax revenues, not all tax
revenues will be used to provide public goods. Let β be the (endogenous) proportion of
tax revenues kept by the state, with proportion (1 − β) spent on public-goods production.
Thus, total spending on public goods is (1− β)(TOαOLO(λOq) + TNαNLN(λNq)). Further,
assume that the state produces public goods according to a concave production technology,
so that total provision of public goods is:
q = [(1− β)(TOαOLO(λOq) + TNαNLN(λNq))]γ (4.1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
q = [(1− β)(TOαOLOλO + TNαNLNλN)]
γ
1−γ (4.2)
17In an extended model, we might further assume that some proportion of public-goods production benefits
both sectors. The results of this section will be more likely to hold, the smaller is that proportion.
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The state solves for the optimal proportion of taxes retained β and allocation λO and λN
across sectors of public-goods production:
max
λO,λN ,β
βTOαOLO(λOq) + βTNαNLN(λNq) (4.3)
s.t. q = [(1− β)(TOαOLOλO + TNαNLNλN)]
γ
1−γ
and λO + λN = 1
or
max
λO,β
β(1− β)
γ
1−γ (TOαOLOλO + TNαNLN(1− λO))
1
1−γ (4.4)
Labor’s problem is analogous to that in Section 2.
Proposition 2. In the model with tax-financed public goods, there are three equilibria:
1) Old equilibrium: L∗O = 1, L
∗
N = 0, λ
∗
O = 1, λ
∗
N = 0, β
∗ = 1− γ.
2) New equilibrium: L∗N = 1, L
∗
O = 0, λ
∗
N = 1, λ
∗
O = 0, β
∗ = 1− γ.
3) Intermediate equilibrium: L
∗
N
L∗O
= TOαO
TNαN
, λ
∗
N
λ∗O
= (1−TO)αO
(1−TN )αN , β
∗ = 1− γ.
Proof. By inspection, (4.4) can be separated into two separate maximization problems:
one over λO, and one over β. With respect to λO, the government will find it optimal to
allocate all public goods to the old sector if TOαOLO > TNαNLN , all to the new sector if
TOαOLO < TNαNLN , and will be indiﬀerent if TOαOLO = TNαNLN . Similarly, labor’s
decision will depend on whether (1 − TO)αOλO is greater or less than (1 − TN)αNλN . As
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in Section 2, these imply two extreme equilibria and an intermediate equilibrium defined by
the indiﬀerence condition for each player.
To see that β∗ = 1−γ, note that β(1−β)
γ
1−γ is quasiconcave over β ∈ [0, 1] for γ ∈ (0, 1)
(and concave for γ ≤ 1
2
). Hence, the first-order condition β∗ = 1 − γ defines a maximum
over β ∈ [0, 1].
The most important thing to note about Proposition 2 is that the equilibria look very
similar to those in Section 2. As before, there are two extreme equilibria and an intermediate
equilibrium. Further, the allocation of public goods across sectors in the intermediate
equilibrium is identical to the allocation of support in Section 2, as is the division of labor
between the old and new sectors. Thus, our arguments about the impact of relative taxability
of the two sectors on the likelihood that the economy will tip into the new equilibrium do
not depend on the assumptions in the model in Section 2 about costliness of government
support.
In addition, Proposition 1 tells us what proportion of public funds a government will
spend on the production of public goods, and what proportion will be skimmed oﬀ for
personal use. As Proposition 2 shows, the share retained by the government is decreasing in
γ. In essence, the better is the public-goods production technology, the more the government
will be motivated to take a small slice of a large pie rather than a large slice of a small pie.
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4.2. Necessity of Government Support
In Section 2, the production function YS = αSLSeS assumed that production is impossible
without government support. The extent to which that assumption holds will depend on
the political-economic environment and the definition of “support.” For example, private
economic activity of any real scale in postcommunist states required legislation and decrees
liberalizing prices and trade. At the same time, many state-owned enterprises were able to
continue operating in the absence of any change in government policy.
To capture variation in the necessity of government support, consider a modified pro-
duction function YS = αSLS(e¯S + eS), with e¯S exogenous. The parameter e¯S might reflect
the stock of support inherited from a previous government, or could capture technological
considerations which determine the extent to which production is possible without govern-
ment intervention to create markets or restrain rent-seeking behavior among bureaucrats.
As the following proposition shows, if e¯S is suﬃciently high (relative to e¯−S), then there is no
multiplicity of equilibria. The unique equilibrium is that in which government support and
factors of production are allocated to the sector with relatively high preexisting “support.”
Proposition 3. In the model with e¯O, e¯N ≥ 0, the old equilibrium will be the unique
equilibrium if:
(1− TO)αOe¯O > (1− TN)αN [e¯N + f(TNαN)] (4.5)
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while the new equilibrium will be the unique equilibrium if:
(1− TN)αN e¯N > (1− TO)αO[e¯O + f(TOαO)] (4.6)
Proof. Without less of generality, consider the case of uniqueness of the old equilib-
rium. Assume to the contrary that there are multiple equilibria when (1 − TO)αOe¯O >
(1− TN)αN [e¯N + f(TNαN)]. Then a new equilibrium will exist in which LN = 1, with gov-
ernment support defined by f(TNαN). Labor will then find it optimal to remain in the new
sector so long as (1− TN)αN [e¯N + f(TNαN)] ≥ (1− TO)αOe¯O, which by assumption is false.
Thus, the new equilibrium does not exist. Nonexistence of the intermediate equilibrium
immediately follows.
Proposition 3 says that an equilibrium will not exist if even full allocation of labor to a
sector does not produce suﬃcient government support to keep labor from migrating to the
other sector. That will be more likely, the more productive is the other sector in the absence
of government support.
How are the predictions of the basic model aﬀected by Proposition 3? The general
conclusion of the analysis in Section 2 is that movement from an old to a new equilibrium
will be diﬃcult if TO > TN . Under certain conditions, that result is strengthened by
Proposition 3. As the following corollary indicates, if support is more important for a new,
low-taxability sector than an old, high-taxability sector, then the mere existence of the new
equilibrium will be threatened by low taxability overall:
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Corollary 2. If TO > TN , and if support is necessary for production to take place in the
new but not the old sector, i.e. e¯N = 0 and e¯O > 0, then a suﬃciently large decline in
taxability aﬀecting both sectors equally (i.e. a reduction of k in both TO and TN) will render
the old equilibrium unique.
Proof. Define T ≡ TN , t = TO−TN , and y = (1−TO)αOe¯O−(1−TN)αN [e¯N+f(TNαN)].
As T → 0, y → (1 − t)αOe¯O, which is clearly greater than zero. Thus, according to
Proposition 2, the old equilibrium is unique.
By assumption, the old sector can operate in the absence of government support, while
the new sector cannot. Thus, low taxability overall, while reducing the incentive of the
government to support either sector, makes the new sector especially unattractive. In the
context of postcommunist political economy, Corollary 2 says that the transition to a new
economy in the former Soviet Union may have been especially diﬃcult due to states’ general
inability to collect taxes from any sector of the economy, their particular inability to tax the
new economy, and the greater necessity of government support for new economic activity to
take place.
4.3. Economies of Scale in Provision of Government Support
In positing the production function YS = αSLSeS and government cost function c = c(eO +
eN), the model in Section 2 implicitly assumed perfect economies of scale in the provision of
government support, i.e. for a single unit of labor the marginal productivity of government
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support is independent of the size of the sector being supported. Thus, for example, the
model assumes that the cost of monitoring bureaucratic compliance with laws regulating
inspections is independent of the size of the sector being inspected.
In fact, while there will typically be economies of scale in providing the sort of support
envisioned in this paper — passage of legislation, monitoring of lower-level bureaucrats, etc.
— the assumption of perfect economies of scale is strong. To examine the extent to which
the conclusions of the model depend on this assumption, consider the production function
YS = αSLS[σeS + (1 − σ) eSLS ]. The parameter σ captures in a simple way the degree to
which economies of scale are present in the provision of government support, i.e. the extent
to which the government is able to stretch a given expenditure of time, energy, etc. across
an entire sector. If σ = 1, then there are perfect economies of scale, and the model is
identical to that in Section 2. If σ = 0, then there are no economies of scale. In this case,
YS = αSeS, and for a given level of government support eS the direct impact of an increase in
labor allocation is completely oﬀset by the fact that government support is now less eﬀective
for any unit of labor.
Further, for technical reasons, assume that an infinitesimally small proportion ² of total
labor supply remains in each of the two sectors regardless of where it is optimal for labor to
locate. Thus, total production in a sector is YS = σαSLSeS+(1−σ)αSeS, where the second
term is well defined because we assume that LS can approach but not equal zero. We then
have the following proposition:
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Proposition 4. In the model with variable economies of scale in provision of government
support, there will be multiple equilibria if and only if (1− σ) ≤ min( TOαO
TNαN
, TNαN
TOαO
). When
there is a unique equilibrium, it will be the equilibrium in support of sector S, where S
satisfies TSαS > T−Sα−S.
Proof. Labor optimizes as in Section 2. To see whether an extreme equilibrium S exists,
we must check whether the government will allocate support to sector S when LS → 1.
Thus, the old equilibrium will exist when TO[σαO + (1 − σ)αO] ≥ TN(1 − σ)αN , i.e. when
(1 − σ) ≤ TOαO
TNαN
. Similarly, the new equilibrium will exist when (1 − σ) ≤ TNαN
TOαO
. Since
(1−σ) ≤ 1, at least one of these conditions will always be met, and in particular when there
is a unique equilibrium the sector S supported will satisfy TSαS
T−Sα−S
> 1.
Proposition 4 states that multiple equilibria will be more likely when economies of scale
are large, i.e. when σ is high. To see why this is the case, recall the logic of the model
in Section 2. Labor chooses to locate in a sector because of government support, but the
government in turn chooses to support a sector because it is large and taxable. If increased
labor allocation to a sector does little to increase the taxable revenues produced by that sector
(because, when economies of scale are small, the direct eﬀect of increased labor allocation is
oﬀset by the reduced eﬀectiveness of a given level of government support for any individual
unit of labor), then this logic disappears.
That said, multiple equilibria may be possible even when economies of scale are small if
TOαO is close to TNαN . Given that it will often be the case that TO > TN but αO < αN , we
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can probably expect that the existence of multiple equilibria will not typically be challenged
by limited economies of scale in the provision of government support.
4.4. Welfare
While the new sector is perhaps inherently more productive than the old, the new equilibrium
does not necessarily dominate the old equilibrium from an eﬃciency point of view. Rather,
any inherent productivity advantage must be weighed against the fact that the government
will provide less support in the new equilibrium if the new sector is considerably less taxable.
Formally, welfare in the equilibrium in support of sector S can be defined as:
WS = αSf(TSαS)− c(f(TSαS)) (4.7)
where we consider only the incentive eﬀects of taxation, implicitly assuming that the gov-
ernment values tax revenues as would labor had those taxes not been collected.18 WS is
increasing in αS (both because αS increases production directly and because it improves
government incentives) and TS (for the latter reason only).19 Thus, even if αN > αO, if
TO >> TN , the old equilibrium may be preferable.
Thus, an economy cursed by government reliance on highly taxable natural resources
18We could alternatively assume that taxation involves a welfare loss of some sort without detracting from
the main point of this section. See Corollary 1.
19For example, ∂WS∂αS = f(TSαS) + TSf
0(TSαS)[αS − c0(f(TSαS))], where αS − c0(f(TSαS)) > 0 since by
the government’s first-order condition TSαS − c0(f(TSαS)) = 0. The derivation for ∂WS∂TS is analogous.
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may nonetheless be preferable to one in which resources are allocated to a sector that the
government exclusively, but only weakly, supports. Of course, as Section 2 showed, movement
from the former to the latter may be a rare phenomenon indeed.
In a world in which government behavior is driven primarily by revenue concerns, the
ideal is when the new economy exhibits both greater inherent productivity and greater
taxability. This not only increases the odds of a successful transition to a new equilibrium,
but assures that the new equilibrium provides greater welfare. The advent of township-
village enterprises in China — which not only benefitted from government support due to
their high (local) taxability, but may also have been inherently more productive than the
traditional industrial and agricultural sectors — seems to meet these conditions (Oi 1992,
Che and Qian 1998, Jin and Qian 1998).
The downside is that the control of local governments over TVEs — which is what provides
for their taxability - carries its own ineﬃciencies, so that αN is probably not so great there
as in, say, Poland. The fact that TVEs and similar firms are easier to tax, by the logic of
this paper, means that they will be harder to dislodge by truly private competitors. Today’s
new equilibrium may become tomorrow’s old.
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
Source:  World Bank (2002), p. 41. 
Table 1:  Privatization and Revenue Performance in Postcommunist States 
 
 1999 EBRD 
Index of  
Large-Scale Privatization
1999 EBRD  
Index of  
Small-Scale Privatization 
1999 General 
Government Revenue
as Percent of GDP 
 
Firms in 
BEEPS Sample
Eastern Europe and Baltics  
  Albania 2 4 21.3 163 
  Bulgaria 3 3+ 39.8 130 
  Croatia 3 4+ 42.8 127 
  Czech Republic 4 4+ 38.7 149 
  Estonia 4 4+ 36.4 132 
  Hungary 4 4+ 39.1 147 
  Latvia 3 4 40.1 166 
  Lithuania 3 4+ 31.7 112 
  Macedonia 3 4 38.0 136 
  Poland 3+ 4+ 40.2 246 
  Romania 3- 4- 33.3 125 
  Slovakia 4 4+ 39.7 138 
  Slovenia 3 4+ 43.6 125 
  Average EE and Baltics   37.3 
Commonwealth of  
  Independent States 
    
  Armenia 3 3+ 20.3 125 
  Azerbaijan 2- 3+ 18.9 137 
  Belarus 1 2 45.7 132 
  Georgia 3+ 4 15.4 129 
  Kazakhstan 3 4 17.4 147 
  Kyrgyzstan 3 4 24.0 132 
  Moldova 3 3+ 27.4 139 
  Russia 3+ 4 35.1 552 
  Ukraine 2+ 3+ 33.7 247 
  Uzbekistan 3- 3 30.4 126 
  Average CIS   26.8 
 
Notes:  Countries included are those represented in the BEEPS dataset (less Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Serb Republic in Bosnia).  
EBRD privatization indexes can take on values from 1 to 4+.   
Sources:  Privatization indexes are from EBRD (2000).  Revenue figures are imputed from expenditure and balance data in EBRD (2001). 
Table 2:  Determinants of Revenue Reporting - OLS Regressions 
(Significance levels:  10% - *; 5% - **; 1% - ***) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Percent of Revenues Reported to Tax Authorities 
       
 Estimated Robust Estimated Robust Estimated Robust 
 coefficient std. error coefficient std. error coefficient std. error 
De novo firm 3.40** 1.35   1.68 1.43 
De novo * CIS -6.79*** 1.74   -3.67* 2.10 
CIS -1.11 1.31 -14.05*** 2.59 -9.58** 3.80 
Log employment 2.90*** 0.36 1.84*** 0.36 2.11*** 0.43 
Log employment * CIS   2.35*** 0.58 1.70** 0.70 
Degree of competition -4.06*** 0.62 -3.97*** 0.62 -4.09*** 0.62 
Transportation sector -4.13** 2.02 -3.82* 2.01 -4.18** 2.02 
Personal-service sector -3.09 2.12 -3.31 2.12 -3.24 2.11 
Wholesale sector -1.75 1.47 -1.52 1.46 -1.65 1.47 
Other sector -1.33 3.31 -1.07 3.26 -1.26 3.27 
Retail sector 0.23 1.47 0.53 1.46 0.37 1.47 
Construction sector 0.82 1.55 0.65 1.54 0.64 1.55 
Resource sector 0.97 1.54 0.42 1.55 0.50 1.55 
Business-service sector 1.91 1.96 1.50 1.98 1.71 1.97 
Finance sector 9.67*** 2.46 10.14*** 2.45 9.90*** 2.46 
Constant 80.95*** 2.76 86.72*** 2.68 85.15*** 3.11 
    
N 3371 3388 3371 
R2  .066 .066 .068 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  Omitted category for sector dummies is manufacturing sector.  Town-size dummies also included in all regressions. 
